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CONVICTIONS OBTAINED BY PERJURED
TESTIMONY: A COMPARATIVE VIEW
DANIEL E. MuRRAY*
You have just been tried, convicted, and imprisoned for a crime
you did not commit. Furthermore, you know but cannot prove that all
prosecution witnesses were vindictive liars, and the prosecuting attor-
ney knew nothing of this. The time for taking an appeal has run. Now,
for the first time, evidence is uncovered which could convict each of the
witnesses against you for perjury. You are still incarcerated. A layman
might think that the presentation of that evidence to the nearest magis-
trate would result almost reflexively in your release. You might secure
an executive pardon on these facts, but pardoning procedure is beyond
the scope of this article. Our question: What are the judicial conse-
quences of such a set of facts in the various states and western
countries?
UNITED STATES
The United States Supreme Court has said that a conviction ob-
tained by the use of perjured testimony violates due process rights to
a fair trial' when the false nature of the testimony was known to the
prosecuting attorney' or the police3 at the time of its use. The allega-
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M ooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (dictum), 35 Colum. L. Rev. 282.
2 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957), 11 Vand. L. Rev. 922 (1958). Seemingly
in accord is Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). The same rule applies even when
the perjured testimony goes only to the credibility of a prosecution witness. Bentley
v. Alaska, 374 U.S. 107 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). White v. Ragen,
324 U.S. 760 (1945); Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, as amended by 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
8 The United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts have held that if
the perjured testimony is introduced by the police without the prosecuting attorney
having any knowledge of its falsity, then there is a violation of the due process
rights of the accused. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Curran v. Delaware, 259
F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1958). Seemingly in accord is Sears v. United States, 265 F.2d 301
(5th Cir. 1959). For a good analysis of what agents of the state are included within
the concept of "the prosecution," see Note, 7 Duke L.J. 150 (1958). Even more
recently, the Supreme Court has held that the suppression of exculpatory evidence
by the prosecuting attorney is a denial of due process "irrespective of good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). A circuit
court had reached the same result in 1950. Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990 (D.C.
Cir. 1950). This rationale was extended in Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th
Cir. 1964), which held that the withholding of exculpatory evidence by the police is a
violation of due process even though the prosecuting attorney did not know of the
existence of the evidence. If the prosecuting attorney deliberately withholds exculpa-
tory or mitigating evidence favoring the accused, it is a denial of due process.
United States v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1951). When the state fails to disclose,
PERJURED TESTIMONY
tions in these cases were consistent in that the prosecution knew of the
false nature of the testimony when it was introduced, and the decisions
were limited to these allegations. It appears that the Court was taking
the knowing aspect for granted as a requisite to find state action.4 If
the perjury were committed without the knowledge of the prosecution,
it would be private rather than state action.
In any event, the lower federal courts with monotonous regularity
interpreted Mooney v. Holokan and its progeny as requiring allega-
tions and proof that the prosecution made a knowing use of the per-
jured testimony in federal criminal cases, as well as in habeas corpus
cases attacking state convictions.5 This construction in the lower fed-
eral courts was paralleled in a majority of the state courts which might
be expected to construe the cases as narrowly as possible in order to
sustain the processes of the state law against attack on a constitutional
basis.' Some of the narrowness of construction by the state courts may
be attributed to the fact that the remedies for attacking a conviction
or suppresses, evidence which affects the credibility of a prosecution witness because
oi his alleged insanity, it is contrary to the fourteenth amendment. Powell v. Winman,
287 F.2d 275 (Sth Cir. 1961).
4 See Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 423 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting). The phrase
"state action" is used in this article in its generic sense whether it be a state or the
federal government.
G Holt v. United States, 303 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1962); Enzor v. United States,
296 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1961); Black v. United States, 269 F.2d 38 (9th Cir. 1959);
Kyle v. United States, 266 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1959); Dean v. United States, 265 F.2d
544 (8th Cir. 1959); Sears v. United States, 265 F.2d 301 (5th Cir. 1959); Dunn
v. United States, 259 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1958); Hickman v. United States, 246 F.2d
178 (8th Cir. 1957); United States v. Ragen, 231 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1956); Taylor v.
United States, 229 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1956) ; In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805 (7th
Cir. 1956); United States v. Rutkin, 212 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1954); United States v.
Spadaford, 200 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1952); Ryles v. United States, 198 F.2d 199 (10th
Cir. 1952); Wild v. Oklahoma, 187 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1951); Hinley v. Burford, 183
F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1950); Story v. Burford, 178 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1949); Cobb v.
Hunter, 167 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1948); Tilgham v. Hunter, 167 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.
1948); Cobb v. United States, 161 F.2d 814 (6th Cir. 1947); Wagner v. Hunter, 161
F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1947); Hodge v. Huff, 140 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Casebeer v.
Hudspeth, 121 F.2d 914 (10th Cir. 1941).
6 See, e.g., Ex parte Burns, 247 Ala. 98, 22 So. 2d 517 (1945); People v. Adamson,
210 P.2d 13 (Cal. 1949); Harris v. State, 167 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964); Burke
v. State, 205 Ga. 656, 54 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Townsend v. Hudspeth, 167 Kan. 366, 205
P.2d 483 (1949); Madison v. State, 109 A.2d 96 (Md. 1954); Aranson v. Commonwealth,
331 Mass. 599, 121 N.E.2d 669 (1954); Roberson v. Quave, 211 Miss. 398, 51 So. 2d
777 (1951); State v. Eaton, 280 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 1955); Hawk v. State, 151 Neb. 561, 39
N.W.2d 561 (1949); People v. McElroy, 11 App. Div. 2d 556, 200 N.Y.S.2d 442 (1960);
Hurt v. State, 312 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1957) (semble) (dictum); Smyth v.
Godwin, 188 Va. 753, 51 S.E.2d 230 (1949).
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based upon fraud had to be developed from a matrix of the writs of
habeas corpus and coram nobis; many of the cases obviously devoted
more discussion to which remedy, if any, was applicable than to the
basic question of the underlying unfairness of a conviction allegedly
obtained by perjury.7
Another reason for the narrowness of construction was the fear
that a convicted person would be able to proceed through the appellate
system in the state or federal system on other grounds, and then be
able to attack his sentence collaterally on the basis that a material wit-
ness furnished false testimony.8 Before Mooney, some state courts had
held that the pardon remedy was exclusive.' This rule may have some
post-Mooney vitality."0 The inability or unwillingness of the courts to
afford a remedy to persons convicted by perjury or innocently false
testimony-introduced without the prosecutor's knowing of its falsity
-was starkly portrayed in two cases where the court stated that the
convicted persons' only avenue of hope was in appeal to the executive
branch for clemency."
Few cases dispensing with any requirement that the prosecution
must have known of the false nature of the testimony when it was in-
troduced exist. In Jones v. Kentucky' the accused was sentenced to
death for murder and, after exhausting his remedies under the laws of
Kentucky, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal dis-
trict court. The Attorney General of Kentucky indicated his belief
that the petitioner had been convicted on perjured testimony. It also
appeared that the Governor of Kentucky would refuse any appeal for
clemency. There was no indication of any knowledge of the prosecution
that the testimony was perjured at the time it was introduced. The
court of appeals, in reversing the district court and granting the writ,
cited the Mooney case as authority, but gave it a liberal interpretation
by stating:
7 See, e.g., People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E.2d 827 (1947).
8 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 295 (1948) (dissenting opinion). It should be
noted that state prisoners who intentionally by-pass state appellate remedies may, within
the sound discretion of the federal court, be denied relief by federal habeas corpus. Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433, 438 (1963).
9 Springstein v. Saunders, 182 Iowa 658, 164 N.W. 622 (1917); Asbell v. State,
62 Kan. 209, 61 Pac. 690 (1900); Humphreys v. State, 129 Wash. 309, 224 Pac. 937
(1924); State v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 339, 46 Pac. 399 (1896).
10 Smith v. State, 200 Ark. 767, 140 S.W.2d 675 (1940).
11 Hickman v. United States, 246 F.2d 178 (8th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Kaplan, 101 F. Supp. 7 (D.C.N.Y. 1951). Accord, Springstein v. Saunders, 182 Iowa
658, 164 N.W. 622 (1917).
12 97 F.2d 335 (6th Cir. 1938).
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If it be urged that the concept thus formulated but condemns
convictions obtained by the state through testimony known by the
prosecuting officers to have been perjured, then the answer must
be that the delineated requirement of due process in the Mooney
Case embraces no more than the facts of that case require, and
that "the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base
of our civil and political institutions" must with equal abhorrence
condemn as a travesty a conviction upon perjured testimony if
later, but fortunately not too late, its falseness is discovered, and
that the state in the one case as in the other is required to afford
a corrective process to remedy the alleged wrong, if constitutional
rights are not to be impaired. 13
Was the court suggesting that failure to grant relief from a convic-
tion obtained by perjured testimony is unconstitutional, in that failure
to undo a conviction violative of due process amounts to a reconviction?
A few years later the court of appeals of Kentucky in Anderson
v. Buchanan4 followed the rationale of Jones v. Kentucky, stating that
Jones had gone beyond the Mooney requirement that there must be a
knowing use of the perjured testimony by the prosecution. The court
buttressed its opinion by stating that "the arm of justice in Kentucky
ought not to be any weaker or shorter than it is in the federal courts.
Our State Constitution also insures every person a 'remedy by due
course of law' for an injury done him in his person."' 5 It would appear
that the court in Anderson was of the view that Mooney merely set
minimum standards of due process under the federal constitution, and
that the state courts could extend due process to encompass cases in
which the prosecution did not know that material testimony was per-
jured when introduced.
The view of the Kentucky court was preceded by an earlier de-
cision of the Supreme Court of Florida. In Skipper v. Schumacher0
a person had been convicted upon allegedly perjured testimony which
was procured by pressures brought to bear upon certain witnesses by
two or three members of the grand jury which indicted the accused.
There was no allegation that the prosecuting officials knew of this con-
duct of the grand jurors, and the court held that this conduct, if true,
would not constitute state action under the Mooney decision. However,
13 Id. at 338. This language was approved and apparently followed in United
States v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1949). However, the district judge
seemingly found knowing use by the prosecution.
14 292 Ky. 810, 168 S.WV.2d 48 (1943).
IG Id. at 818, 168 S.W.2d at 52. The Kentucky cases are discussed in Comment,
"The Writ of Error Comm Nobis-Kentucky's Answer to the Expanding Federal
Concept of Procedural Due Process in Criminal Cases," 39 Ky. LJ. 440 (1951).
10 124 Fla. 384, 169 So. 58 (1936).
1966]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the court held that this conviction, if in fact obtained by perjured
testimony, was contrary to the due process clause of the state consti-
tution and a writ of error coram nobis would lie. One year later, the
court in an inexplicable decision refused to grant the writ of error
coram nobis and completely ignored the first decision.17 Florida now
follows the view that knowing use of the perjured testimony must be
shown to attack the conviction.' 8
The Pennsylvania superior court in Commonwealth v. Coroniti9
stated that new trials should be granted "if perjury by an essential
witness is admitted or shown by incontrovertible evidence ... but if
there is doubt as to the falsity of the testimony a new trial is properly
refused.'20 The court failed to mention possible knowing use of the
perjured testimony by the prosecution, nor did it question the right
to ask for a new trial which was raised eight years after the conviction;
the motion was denied because of a failure to prove the alleged per-
jury by incontrovertible evidence. Indiana may follow this minority
view; however, the rationale of the Indiana cases is not clear.21
The majority view seems to give an unduly restrictive view to
the concept of state action. The fact that the perjured testimony was
unwittingly used by the prosecution does not change the fact that there
was state action in indicting, trying, and convicting the accused. Nor
should the fact that the imprisoned person is serving a sentence for
a crime which he may not have committed be ignored. A court ap-
pears to do violence to the notion that due process is based upon
a concept of fairness when it admits that a miscarriage of justice may
have resulted but then says that due process has not been violated.
17 Skipper v. State, 127 Fla. 553, 173 So. 692 (1937). See the strong dissent by
Mr. Justice Brown, who raised the issue of the original holding in this case.
18 Harris v. State, 167 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964); Ingrim v. State, 166
So. 2d 805 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964); Austin v. State, 160 So. 2d 730 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964).
19 170 Pa. Super. 245, 85 A.2d 673 (1952).
20 Id. at 675. But see Commonwealth ex rel. v. Burke, 176 Pa. Super. 60, 107 A.2d
207 (1954), which held that habeas corpus is not appropriate when alleging knowing
use of perjured testimony. This case failed to cite the Coroniti case.
21 In Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88, 161 N.E. 375 (1928), a writ of error coram
nobis was granted upon a petition which alleged perjury induced by the prosecutor.
The court did not state that the knowing use or inducement of perjury by the prosecu-
tion was a requisite; the point was not even discussed. However, the dissenting
opinion in Yessen v. State, 234 Ind. 311, 126 N.E.2d 760 (1955), stated that the Davis
case held that knowing use was not a requisite. Kleihege v. State, 177 N.E. 60 (1931),
as superseded by Kleihege v. State, 206 Ind. 206, 188 N.E. 786 (1934), seems to be
in accord with the Davis case. However, Hicks v. State, 213 Ind. 277, 12 N.E.2d 501
(1938), held that neither a new trial nor a writ of error coram nobis could be granted
for a conviction obtained by false testimony; the court failed to suggest that any
relief could be granted. See Note, 26 Ind. L.J. 529 (1951).
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There is also a practical objection to the continuation of the
majority rule. It is unrealistic in most cases to expect the police or the
prosecuting attorneys to admit that they knew the testimony was per-
jured when it was introduced; it is even more unrealistic to expect that
they will admit this fact when they were the instigators of the perjured
testimony 22 for an admission in either case might subject them to
criminal or disciplinary proceedings. As a result, even though there
may be no question that perjured testimony was used, it is virtually
impossible to prove the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities be-
cause it will be the word of a confessed perjurer against the word of
the authorities.
The Supreme Court of the United States should have little diffi-
culty under its ever expanding definitions of due process23 to declare
that any conviction obtained as a result of perjured testimony unknow-
ingly utilized by the prosecution in a state or federal trial does violence
to the right of due process. However, it is believed that legislation
which clearly delineates the grounds and procedures for vacating
sentences would be preferable since it would eliminate any need for
the courts to devote attention to the choice of the applicable remedial
tool.24 The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 195525 and the
United States Code2' provide a remedy when the sentence was formerly
subject to collateral attack upon any ground available under a writ
of habeas corpus, writ of coram nobis, or other common law or statu-
tory remedy. The substantive grounds are, however, rather limited in
that these codifications fail to provide specific detailed grounds for an
attack of a sentence: a sentence may be attacked if it was imposed in
violation of the federal or state constitutions or laws of the state, if
22 United States v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382, 390 (N.D. Ill. 1949). It should be
noted, however, that the prosecutor in Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957), did admit
that he knew that the testimony was untrue when it was introduced.
23 E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). However, Mr. Justice Warren's
opinion in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), one of the more recent Supreme
Court decisions on the use of perjured testimony, still seems to reflect a narrow due
process approach in this area.
24 See Reitz, "Federal Habeas Corpus: Post-Conviction Remedy for State
Prisoners," 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 461 (1960); Comment, "The Relation Between Habeas
Corpus and Coram Nobis in New York," 34 Cornell L.Q. 596 (1949); Comment,
"Post-Conviction Remedies-The Need for Coram Nobis," 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 467 (1962).
25 9B Uniform Laws Ann. 352 (1957). This act, or a variation of it, has been
adopted in Ilinois, Maryland, North Carolina, and Oregon. See Meador, "Accommo-
dating State Criminal Procedure and Federal Post-Conviction Review," 50 A.B.A.J.
928 (1964).
20 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
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the court was without jurisdiction, or if the court was otherwise sub-
ject to collateral attack upon any ground.
In 1833 Georgia enacted a statute which provides that any judg-
ment, verdict, or order of court may be set aside if it were entered as
a consequence of corrupt and willful perjury. 7 However, the court
may not set aside the judgment "unless the person charged with such
perjury shall have been thereof duly convicted, and unless it shall
appear to the said court that the said verdict. . . could not have been
obtained and entered up without the evidence of such perjured person."
This statute has been held to be a rule of evidence which is in harmony
with the Mooney line of cases, and is, therefore, constitutional2 It
is submitted that this statute, although supposedly remedial in nature,
creates an additional roadblock in the release of an unjustly convicted
person. Under this statute, even if the witnesses in the former trial
recant their testimony or the prosecuting authorities admit the know-
ing use of the perjured testimony, the convicted person is apparently
not entitled to a new trial until the perjurers have been convicted for
the perjury. This appears contrary to the Mooney line of cases.
This statute appears deficient in one further aspect: if the statute
of limitations for the prosecution of perjury has run, there would be no
opportunity for a conviction of perjury and the unjustly convicted
person would be denied relief.
This statute does, however, enable a court to rectify its own mis-
takes, and it permits an unjustly convicted person to plead the statute
without resorting to any constitutional issue.
ENGLAND
The English Criminal Appeal Act"0 provides for an unusual
blending of the cooperative efforts of the executive and judicial
branches of the government in post-appeal proceedings to examine
fresh evidence of perjury or of any other kind of evidence which was
not introduced at the trial. Under section 19(1) of this Act, the Home
Secretary, with or without application made to him by a person con-
victed on indictment may either: (a) refer the whole case to the Court
of Criminal Appeal and the case shall then be treated for all purposes
as an appeal to that court by the person convicted; or (b) if he de-.
sires the assistance of the Court of Criminal Appeal on any point
27 Ga. Code Ann. § 110-706 (1963).
28 Burke v. State, 205 Ga. 656, 54 S.E.2d 350 (1949).
29 Id. at 660, 54 S.W.2d at 353.
80 Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, as amended by the Administration
of justice Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Ella 2, c. 65.
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arising in the case, refer that point to the Court of Criminal Appeal
for its opinion thereon, and the court shall consider the point so re-
ferred and furnish the Home Secretary with its opinion thereon.
A convicted person may use the above procedure even after he had
appealed on other grounds,"' or even though he failed to ask for leave
to appeal.2
When an application by a convicted person has been made to the
Home Secretary, the Secretary is not bound by any court rules of evi-
dence and he "can hear and consider any evidence he likes which would
influence him in considering whether or not he should advise the exer-
cise of the royal prerogative. ' 33 If the Secretary refers the matter to
the Court of Criminal Appeal, the court seems also to have a wide lati-
tude in hearing any fresh evidence which may tend to show that it
would have affected the jury which returned the verdict.34 This evidence
may consist of a witness to prove a case of mistaken identity even
though the witness was available at the original trial," of further testi-
mony by an expert witness in order to elucidate testimony which he
gave at the trial,36 of a passport to support an alibi even though the
passport was available at the trial,3 7 or of a subsequent explanatory
confession of an accomplice which clears the convicted person. 3
The author has been unable to discover any case brought under
this section which involved any allegation of perjured as distinguished
from mistaken testimony.39 However, the Court of Criminal Appeal
has permitted the introduction of fresh evidence in direct appeals in
cases involving the perjury of a Crown witness40 and the impeachment
of the prosecuting witness for a lack of veracity. 1 Neither case even
implied that knowing use of the perjury by the prosecution was a
31 E.g., R. v. Sparkes, 40 Crim. App. R. 83 (1956); R. v. McGrath, [19491 2
All. E.R. 495 (C.C.A.); R. v. Fratson, 22 Crim. App. R. 29 (1930).
32 Regina v. Caborn-Waterfield, [1956) 2 Q.B. 379, 385 (C.CA.); R. v. Gray,
12 Crim. App. R. 244 (1917).
33 R. v. McGrath, supra note 31, at 497.
34 Ibid.
35 R. v. McGrath, supra note 31.
36 R. v. Fratson, supra note 31.
37 R. v. Sparkes, supra note 31.
38 R. v. Gray, supra note 32. Compare Shaver v. Ellis, 255 F.2d 509 (5th Cir.
1958).
39 Regina v. Caborn-Waterfield, supra note 32, certainly involved a series of
contradictory statements which could be classified as perjured; however, the incon-
sistent witnesses were not called by the appellant on the appeal and the case was decided
on other grounds.
40 R. v. Donovan & Hurley, 2 Crim. App. R. 1 (1909).
41 R. v. Parks, [1916] 3 All E.R. 633.
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requisite for overturning the conviction. If the test is for the court
to consider "whether, if that evidence had been given before the jury,
it might have had the effect of raising in the minds of the jury a
reasonable doubt,) 42 it would seem that the question of the knowing
or unknowing use of the perjured testimony by the prosecution would
be irrelevant.
Until recently, the power of the Court of Criminal Appeal upon
reference from the Secretary was limited to affirming or quashing the
conviction; the court had no power to order a new trial.43 However,
the public furor created over the "Lucky Gordon-Christine Keeler-
Lord Profumo" cases induced the enactment of an amendment to the
Criminal Appeal Act which provides that
where an appeal against conviction is allowed by the Court of
Criminal Appeal by reason only of evidence received or available
to be received by that Court under section 9 of the Criminal
Appeal Act 1907 and it appears to the Court that the interests of
justice so require, the Court may, instead of directing the entry of a
judgment and verdict of acquittal as required by section 4(2) of
that Act, order the appellant to be retried.44
It is to be noted that the emphasized words would seem to refer
exclusively to a case wherein the Court of Criminal Appeal allows a
direct appeal from the conviction, rather than wherein the Secretary
refers the case to the court under section 19(1) of the Criminal Appeal
Act.45 However, under the wording of section 19(1) which provides
that when the Secretary refers the whole case to the Court of Criminal
Appeal it "shall then be treated for all purposes as an appeal to that
court by the person convicted," and under the wording of rule 48 of
the Criminal Appeal Rules, 1908,4 which provides that a petitioner
whose case is referred shall be deemed for the purposes of the act to
be a person who has obtained leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal,
it would appear that the Court of Appeal now has the power to award
a new trial in appropriate cases. This power may result in a more
liberal utilization by the Home Secretary and the Court of Appeal
of the power to investigate and correct convictions allegedly obtained
by perjured testimony. Prior to this new legislation, there seems to have
been a reluctance on the part of either to accept responsibility 47 This
42 R. v. Harding, 25 Crim. App. R. 190, 196 (1936).
43 Rex v. Rowland, [19471 K.B. 460 (C.C.A.).
44 Criminal Appeal Act, 1964, 12 Eliz. 2, c. 43 [section 1(1)]. (Emphasis added.)
45 Supra note 30.
46 See Archbold, Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice 371-72 (35th ed. 1962).
47 For a succinct explanation of the background to the new and former legislation
governing appeals for fresh evidence and the Home Secretary's prerogative of mercy,
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reluctance may have been caused by a feeling that the opposite ex-
tremes of a judgment of acquittal or an affirmance of conviction were
not appropriate when there was some, but not an overwhelming, doubt
about the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. Now, the Home Secre-
tary may refer a case to the Court of Appeal realizing that an unjustly
convicted person may be acquitted without a retrial while a "guilty"
person may be reconvicted at a retrial after his allegations of perjured
testimony have been proven false.
FRANCE
In France revision of the judgment of conviction may be requested
for the benefit of any person convicted of a felony or misdemeanor
"when the witnesses heard [at the trial] have after the conviction
been prosecuted and convicted for false testimony against the ac-
cused . . . the witness thus convicted may not be heard in the new
trial;" and "when, after a conviction, a fact presents or reveals itself
or when evidence unknown at the time of the trial is produced of a
nature to establish the innocence of the convicted person. ' '4S
A petition for revision based upon the first ground may be brought
by the Minister of Justice, the convicted person, or his legal represen-
tative if he lacks capacity or after his death by his wife, children,
parents, universal legatees, or those by universal right who have re-
ceived from him express permission to do so. Only the Minister of
Justice may bring the petition when it is based upon newly discovered
evidence, the second ground above.4 The Court of Cassation has juris-
diction over the petition. It shall first determine the merits of the
petition, and, if it deems that it is well founded, it shall annul the con-
viction. If it is possible to remand the case for a new trial it will be
remanded to a court of the same jurisdiction and degree as the original
court, but not to the same court. If it is impossible to proceed to a new
trial, notably in case of the death, insanity, absence, or default of one
or several of the convicted persons, penal irresponsibility or excus-
ability, or if the running of the statute of limitations will make a new
trial impossible, then the Court of Cassation may itself annul the
conviction."0
The exonerating decision may award damages to the wrongfully
convicted person upon his request. If the victim of judicial error is
see Committee on Criminal Appeals, A Report by Justice-Criminal Appeals 5, 13,
27-38, 70-76 (1964).
48 Code de Procidure PWnale, art. 622 (France 1959) [Hereinafter cited as French
Code].
49 French Code, art. 623.
50 French Code, art. 625.
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dead, his spouse, ascendents, or descendents have a right to request
damages under the same conditions as the convicted person. The
damages shall be charged to the State, subject to its recourse against
the civil party, the accuser, or the false witness through whose fault
the conviction was pronounced. 51
GERmANY
The German Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the re-
opening of proceedings upon motion of a convicted person:
1. in the event a document, produced at the trial to his disadvan-
tage, was false or forged;
2. in the event a witness or expert, during testimony made or while
giving an opinion against a convicted person, was guilty of will-
ful or negligent violation of the duty imposed by the oath, or of
willfully making a false unsworn statement;
5. in the event new facts or evidence were produced, which them-
selves or in connection with the evidence previously taken,
are proper to support an acquittal of the accused or, by applica-
tion of a less serious criminal statute, to allow a lower punish-
ment or an essentially different decision on a measure of security
and reform.52
The motion for the reopening of the proceedings will not be barred
even though the punishment has been executed or the convicted person
has died. In the case of death of the convicted person, his spouse, rela-
tives in an ascending and descending line as well as his brothers and
sisters are empowered to make the motion.53
This German procedure of reopening uniquely provides a two-
edged sword. The state may move for a reopening of the proceedings
in the event of an acquittal if documents which were introduced at
the trial in favor of the accused were false or forged, or in the event
that testimony of witnesses or the opinions of experts were introduced
in favor of the accused and the witnesses or experts were guilty of
willful or negligent violation of the duty imposed by their oath or were
guilty of making false unsworn statements. Further, if the acquitted
defendant either in or out of the courtroom makes a credible confession
of having committed the offense, the case may be reopened.'
The motion for reopening the judgment is filed in the court which
51 French Code, art 626.
52 Strasprozessordnung, art. 359 (Germany 1877) (as amended, 1950, 1953, 1957)
[Hereinafter cited as German Code].
53 German Code, art. 361.
54 German Code, arts. 362-63.
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entered the judgment and the court must admit it if it is submitted
in the provided form in which a legal ground for reopening is presented
and proper evidence is indicated in the motion.5 Upon being accepted,
the court appoints a judge to take evidence if it is necessary to do so.
The court has discretion to decide whether the witnesses and experts
should be heard under oath. After the closing of the evidence, the
prosecution and the accused shall be summoned to make further com-
ments within a fixed period."'
The motion to reopen the proceedings may be rejected without an
oral trial if the court decides that the forged documents or false testi-
mony did not influence the decision in the original case. In all other
cases, the court will order the reopening of the proceedings and a new
trial."7 If the convicted person has died, the court may order an acquit-
tal or reject the motion to reopen after taking evidence. The court may
acquit a living convicted person immediately if sufficient evidence is
available and if the prosecution consents in the case of public charges. 8
If the court orders a renewed trial, the former judgment will either
be sustained or, if reversed, another decision will be made. The original
judgment as to the kind and amount of punishment may not be changed
to the disadvantage of the convicted person if the reopening of the
proceedings was moved by the convicted person, by his legal repre-
sentative, or by the prosecution if the latter moved for the reopening
in favor of the convicted person. However, the foregoing provision
does not prevent the court from ordering the internment of the accused
in an institution for cure and treatment, for the cure of alcoholism,
or for the cure of drug addiction. 9
SPAIN
The Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure clearly articulates a
remedy for the person unjustly convicted as a result of false testimony.
The recourse of revision shall take place:
When any one is suffering a term of imprisonment by virtue of a
sentence which has been based on a document or testimony later
declared false by a final sentence in a criminal cause, [or on] a
confession of the condemned person extracted by violence or
exaction or any other punishable act executed by a third person, pro-
vided that said latter extremes also have been declared by a final
sentence in a cause instituted to this effect. To this end there shall be
55 German Code, art. 368.
GO German Code, art. 369.
57 German Code, art. 370.
58 German Code, art. 371.
59 German Code, art. 373.
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performed as many proofs as shall be considered necessary for the
clarification of the controverted facts in the case, performing at once
those [proofs] which by their special circumstances may make diffi-
cult and even the final sentence impossible, [which is] the base of
the revision.60
The recourse of revision will also lie "when after the sentence
there has occurred knowledge of new facts or of new elements of
proof of such a nature that evidence the innocence of the condemned
person."'" This recourse of revision may be brought by the condemned
person, his spouse, descendents, ascendents, or brothers or sisters.62
The foregoing relatives may even institute the recourse after the death
of the condemned person in order to clear his name and to punish
the guilty person.6 3 The prosecutor of the Supreme Court may also
institute this recourse on his own initiative.6 4 The prisoner who has
been subsequently absolved or his I eirs may secure an indemnification
from the state for his unjust imprisonment "without prejudice to the
right of the latter [the State] to claim against the sentencing judge
or tribunal which has incurred responsibility or against the person
declared directly responsible or his heirs."65
MEXICO
The Republic of Mexico has a Federal Code of Penal Procedure6
which governs the procedure for the trial of crimes committed against
the government or its agencies, e.g., robbing the mails or railroads.
The Republic also has a Code of Penal Procedure for the Federal
District and the Federal Territories" which governs the procedure
for crimes committed against nongovernmental entities in the Federal
District (Mexico City) and federal territories. In addition, the various
states have the right to enact codes of criminal procedure for crimes
committed within their boundaries. Both of the federal codes provide
that the final sentence in a criminal case becomes irrevocable after
the time for filing recourse has expired. However, both of these
60 Law of Criminal Procedure, art. 954(3) (Spain 1882), as amended [Hereinafter
cited as Spanish Code].
61 Spanish Code, art. 954(4).
62 Spanish Code, art. 955.
03 Spanish Code, art. 961.
64 Spanish Code, art. 957.
15 Spanish Code, art. 960.
66 Codigo Federal De Procedimientos Penales (Mexico 1934).
67 Codigo De Procedimientos Penales para El Distrito y Territorios Federales
(Mexico 1931).
68 Codigo Federal De Procedimientos Penales, art. 360 (Mexico 1934); Codigo De
Procedimientos Penales para El Distrito y Territorios Federales, art. 443 (Mexico 1931).
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federal codes provide for a judicial system of procedure for obtaining
a pardon of sentences obtained by false testimony or documents. It is
surprising to note that the wording of these two codes is quite different.
The Code of Penal Procedure for the Federal District and Federal Ter-
ritories provides that the pardon is necessary "(1) when the sentence
is founded on documents or declarations of witnesses which, after dic-
tation [of sentence], are declared false in court; (2) when, after the
sentence documents appear which invalidate the proof on which the
sentence rests or [which invalidate] the proof presented to the jury
and which were the basis on which the accusation and the verdict
were founded .... I'll The Federal Code of Penal Procedure provides
for the pardon "(1) when the sentence is founded exclusively on proofs
which subsequently are declared false; (2) when after the sentence
there appear public documents which invalidate the proof on which
the sentence was founded or [the proofs] presented to the jury and
which served to base the accusation and the verdict .... 7o
It is to be noted that under the first code, private documents can
be used to invalidate the proof, while the second code requires that
public documents be utilized. Further, the use of the modifying word
"exclusively" may evidence a more strict application than would be
appropriate in the first code. Both codes provide that after a favorable
decision is rendered by the reviewing court, it is submitted to the
Secretary of the Government for transmittal to the President who
then is required to grant the pardon.7 1 It would appear that this system
eliminates any political considerations in the granting of the pardon,
and the judicial branch retains the power to correct its own mistakes.
It is submitted that this system is an improvement over the various
systems in use in the United States.
CONCLUSION
The vexing problem presented by convictions obtained by perjured
testimony could be solved in the United States by a uniform statute
providing that any criminal conviction could be set aside by the court
which entered it, if the conviction was obtained as the result of false
testimony or of forged or false documents. The statute should state
that it would not be necessary to allege and prove that the false testi-
mony or false or forged documents were introduced knowingly by the
69 Codigo De Procedimientos Penales para El Distrito y Territorios Federales,
art. 614, §§ 1, 2 (Mexico 1931).
70 Codigo De Procedimientos Penales, art. 560, §§ 1, 2 (Mexico 1934).
71 Codigo Federal De Procedimientos Penales, art. 567 (Mexico 1934). Cf. Codigo
De Procedimientos Penales para El Distrito y Territorios Federales, art. 618 (Mexico
1931), providing for a similar procedure.
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prosecution. The convicted person could institute the collateral attack
by a motion filed with the trial court at any time while he was serving
his sentence or even after it had been completed. This proposed statute
would provide expressly that the falsity of the testimony or document
would not have to be first determined in a criminal trial for perjury
before the motion could be filed. 2
The movant would have to allege in his motion and prove a prima
facie case at a preliminary hearing before the trial judge that perjury
was utilized in his trial and that the conviction would not have ensued
without this false testimony or documentary evidence. An adverse
decision by the judge would be appealable as a final judgment.
If the trial judge under this proposed statute should find that
the movant had proved a prima facie case, he would then order that
a trial be held to determine the truth or falsity of the impugned testi-
mony or documents. If this trial should determine that the testimony or
document was false and the judge believes that the original conviction
could not have been obtained without this false evidence, he would then
acquit the accused. On the other hand, if the judge believes that the
original conviction might have been obtained without this false evi-
dence, or he is in doubt, he would order a new trial to be conducted
on the original charges.
The trial to determine the truth or falsity of the impugned testi-
mony or documents would be civil in nature, and the burden of proof
prevailing in a criminal case for perjury would not be applicable: The
proposed statute should also grant immunity to a witness who has
recanted his original testimony before the convicted person has filed
his motion to vacate the judgment.
If the assertion that perjury is present in seventy-five per cent of
criminal cases is accurate,7 there is a need for a simple remedy for the
unjustly convicted person. The legal realists in the civilian legal sys-
tems have recognized the need for corrective devices; we delude our-
selves by refusing to recognize the existence of the problem.
72 It is submitted that any requirement that the fact of a perjury must be estab-
lished first in a criminal prosecution for perjury may tend to stultify any relief for
the victim of the perjured testimony, because the prosecuting officials may refuse to
initiate perjury proceedings against the witness and the courts may not have any
power to compel the prosecutor to initiate proceedings. State v. Circuit Court, 214 Ind.
152, 14 N.E.2d 910 (1938); Hassan v. Magistrate's Court, 191 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
73 Whitman, "A Proposed Solution to the Problem of Perjury In Our Courts,"
59 Dick. L. Rev. 127 (1955).
